Cicero - Tusculan Disputations

Book 2 - On Bearing Pain

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Source: Latin Library

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I. §1. Neoptolemus quidem apud Ennium "philosophari sibi" ait "necesse esse, sed paucis; nam omnino haud placere". Ego autem, Brute, necesse mihi quidem esse arbitror philosophari; nam quid possum, praesertim nihil agens, agere melius? sed non paucis, ut ille. Difficile est enim in philosophia pauca esse ei nota cui non sint aut pleraque aut omnia. Nam nec pauca nisi e multis eligi possunt nec, qui pauca perceperit, non idem reliqua eodem studio persequetur.

§2. Sed tamen in vita occupata atque, ut Neoptolemi tum erat, militari, pauca ipsa multum saepe prosunt et ferunt fructus, si non tantos quanti ex universa philosophia percipi possunt, tamen eos quibus aliqua ex parte interdum aut cupiditate aut aegritudine aut metu liberemur; velut ex ea disputatione quae mihi nuper habita est in Tusculano, magna videbatur mortis effecta contemptio, quae non minimum valet ad animum metu liberandum. Nam qui id quod vitari non potest metuit, is vivere animo quieto nullo modo potest; sed qui non modo quia necesse est mori, verum etiam quia nihil habet mors quod sit horrendum, mortem non timet, magnum is sibi praesidium ad beatam vitam comparat.

§3. Quamquam non sumus ignari multos studiose contra esse dicturos; quod vitare nullo modo potuimus, nisi nihil omnino scriberemus. Etenim si orationes, quas nos multitudinis iudicio probari volebamus (popularis est enim illa facultas, et effectus eloquentiae est audientium adprobatio) sed si reperiebantur non nulli qui nihil laudarent, nisi quod se imitari posse confiderent, quemque sperandi sibi, eumdem bene dicendi finem proponerent, et cum obruerentur copia sententiarum atque verborum, ieiunitatem et famem se malle quam ubertatem et copiam dicerent, unde erat exortum genus Atticorum eis ipsis qui id sequi se profitebantur ignotum, qui iam conticuerunt paene ab ipso foro inrisi –

§4. quid futurum putamus, cum adiutore populo quo utebamur antea, nunc minime nos uti posse videamus? Est enim philosophia paucis contenta iudicibus, multitudinem consulto ipsa fugiens eique ipsi et suspecta et invisa, ut, vel si quis universam velit vituperare, secundo id populo facere possit, vel si in eam quam nos maxime sequimur, conetur invadere, magna habere possit auxilia a reliquorum philosophorum disciplinis.

Source: Andrew P. Peabody, Cicero's Tusculan Disputations, Boston: Little & Brown, 1886 (pp. 195–250).

1. Grounds on which philosophy is distrusted or despised.

1. NEOPTOLEMUS is made by Ennius in the tragedy [note: an unknown work] to say that he found it necessary to philosophize, but only as to a few things ; for as a general pursuit it gave him no pleasure. I regard it as necessary for me to cultivate philosophy ; (for what else can I do, especially now that I have no regular employment ?) but not, like him, as to a few things. For in philosophy it is difficult for one to know a few things, who is not conversant with many or all. Indeed, the few things can be chosen only out of many ; nor yet will he who has obtained the knowledge of a few things fail to pursue what still remains unknown with like zeal. But yet in a busy career, and in a military life, as that of Neoptolemus then was, the few things are often of benefit, and bear fruit, if not as much as can be reaped from the entire range of philosophy, yet sufficient to yield us in some degree occasional relief from desire, or grief, or fear. Thus the discussion which I lately held in iny Tusculan villa seemed to result in the entire contempt of death, which is of no little worth in freeing the soul from fear; for he who fears what cannot be avoided, cannot possibly live with a quiet mind. But he who has no fear of death, not only because oue must needs die, but because there is nothing in death to be dreaded, obtains for himself great help toward a happy life. Yet I am not unaware that I shall encounter the earnest opposition of many, which I could avoid only by writing nothing at all. For if my orations, in which I meant to satisfy the judgment of the people at large, — eloquence being a popular talent, employed with a view to the approval of the hearers, — yet found some who would praise nothing which they did not feel able to imitate, who assigned to good speaking only the limit which they hoped to reach, aud when overwhelmed with the affluence of thoughts and words, said that they pre-ferred leanness and baldness to wealth of thought and richness of diction (wheuce sprang the so-called Attic style, which in its true sense was beyond the comprehension of those who professed to practise it, who now have become silent, having been driven by ridicule out of the very courts of justice), what can I expect, now that I cannot have in the least degree the countenance and sympathy of the people, which I was formerly wont to have ? For philosophy is content with the judgment of the few, purposely shunning the multitude, by which it is in its turn both suspected and hated, — so that if one wishes to cast reproach on philosophy as a whole, he can do so with the approval of the people; while if he attempts to assail the philosophical doctrines which I specially advocate, he can derive great assistance from the teachings of other schools of philosophy.


II. Nos autem universae philosophiae vituperatoribus respondimus in Hortensio, pro Academia autem quae dicenda essent, satis accurate in Academicis quattuor libris explicata arbitramur; sed tamen tantum abest, ut scribi contra nos nolimus, ut id etiam maxime optemus. In ipsa enim Graecia philosophia tanto in honore numquam fuisset, nisi doctissimorum contentionibus dissensionibusque viguisset.

§5. Quam ob rem hortor omnes qui facere id possunt, ut huius quoque generis laudem iam languenti Graeciae eripiant et transferant in hanc urbem, sicut reliquas omnes, quae quidem erant expetendae, studio atque industria sua maiores nostri transtulerunt. Atque oratorum quidem laus ita ducta ab humili venit ad summum, ut iam, quod natura fert in omnibus fere rebus, senescat brevique tempore ad nihilum ventura videatur, philosophia nascatur Latinis quidem litteris ex his temporibus, eamque nos adiuvemus nosque ipsos redargui refellique patiamur. Quod ii ferunt animo iniquo qui certis quibusdam destinatisque sententiis quasi addicti et consecrati sunt eaque necessitate constricti, ut, etiam quae non probare soleant, ea cogantur constantiae causa defendere; nos qui sequimur probabilia nec ultra quam id quod veri simile occurrit, progredi possumus, et refellere sine pertinacia et refelli sine iracundia parati sumus.

§6. Quodsi haec studia traducta erunt ad nostros, ne bibliothecis quidem Graecis egebimus, in quibus multitudo infinita librorum propter eorum est multitudinem qui scripserunt. Eadem enim dicuntur a multis, ex quo libris omnia referserunt. Quod accidet etiam nostris, si ad haec studia plures confluxerint. Sed eos, si possumus, excitemus, qui liberaliter eruditi adhibita etiam disserendi elegantia ratione et via philosophantur.

2. Desirableness of original writings in that department, instead of depending on the Greeks.

2. But I have answered those who heap contumely on all philosophy, in my Hortensius; while I think that in my four Books of Academics I have drawn out at sufficient length what ought to be said in behalf of the philosophy of the Academy. Yet I am so far from not wishing to be written against, that I very greatly prefer it; for philosophy would never have attained such honor in Greece, unless it had flourished by means of the controversies and disputes of the most learned men. I therefore urge all who can do so to wrest superior merit in this department from Greece, now in her decline, and to make it the property of our own city, as our ancestors by their zeal and industry transferred hither all the other arts that were desirable. Thus while the glory of our orators, raised from the lowest point, has reached the summit whence — as is the law of nature as to almost everything — it must lapse into senile decay and shortly come to nought, let philosophy in its Latin garb have its birth at this very time; and let us give it our aid, and suffer ourselves to be argued against and refuted. This, to be sure, is borne reluctantly by those who are, so to speak, devoted and consecrated to certain fixed and determinate opinions, and bound by a necessity which compels them for consistency's sake to defend what they do not heartily approve. On the other hand, we who seek the probable, and assert of no proposition anything more than its truthlikeness in our own view, are ready to refute without obstinacy, and to be refuted without anger. But if these studies shall be transferred to our people, we shall no longer need the Greek libraries, in which there is an infinite number of books, on account of the multitude of writers ; for the same things are said over and over again by many writers, so that their books are crammed with repetitions. This indeed will be the case with our people, if many shall crowd into these studies. But if we can, let us rouse those who are liberally educated to philosophize with reason and method, and at the same time to consult elegance of diction in their discussions.


III. §7. Est enim quoddam genus eorum qui se philosophos appellari volunt, quorum dicuntur esse Latini sane multi libri; quos non contemno equidem, quippe quos numquam legerim; sed quia profitentur ipsi illi qui eos scribunt se neque distincte neque distribute neque eleganter neque ornate scribere, lectionem sine ulla delectatione neglego. Quid enim dicant et quid sentiant ii qui sunt ab ea disciplina, nemo ne mediocriter quidem doctus ignorat. Quam ob rem, quoniam quem ad modum dicant ipsi non laborant, cur legendi sint nisi ipsi inter se qui idem sentiunt, non intellego.

§8. Nam, ut Platonem reliquosque Socraticos et deinceps eos qui ab his profecti sunt legunt omnes, etiam qui illa aut non adprobant aut non studiosissime consectantur, Epicurum autem et Metrodorum non fere praeter suos quisquam in manus sumit, sic hos Latinos ii soli legunt qui illa recta dici putant. Nobis autem videtur, quicquid litteris mandetur, id commendari omnium eruditorum lectioni decere; nec, si id ipsi minus consequi possumus, idcirco minus id ita faciendum esse sentimus.

§9. Itaque mihi semper Peripateticorum Academiaeque consuetudo de omnibus rebus in contrarias partis disserendi non ob eam causam solum placuit, quod aliter non posset quid in quaque re veri simile esset inveniri, sed etiam quod esset ea maxima dicendi exercitatio. Qua princeps usus est Aristoteles, deinde eum qui secuti sunt. Nostra autem memoria Philo, quem nos frequenter audivimus, instituit alio tempore rhetorum praecepta tradere, alio philosophorum: ad quam nos consuetudinem a familiaribus nostris adducti in Tusculano, quod datum est temporis nobis, in eo consumpsimus. Itaque cum ante meridiem dictioni operam dedissemus, sicut pridie feceramus, post meridiem in Academiam descendimus; in qua disputationem habitam non quasi narrantes exponimus, sed eisdem fere verbis, ut actum disputatumque est.

3. Worthlessness of the Epicurean treatises that have already appeared in the Latin tongue.

3. There is, indeed, a certain class of men who want to be called philosophers, who are said to have written many Latin books, which I do not despise, because I have never read them ; but inasmuch as their authors profess to write with neither precision, nor system, nor elegance, nor ornament, I omit reading what can give me no pleasure. For no moderately learned man is ignorant of what those of that school say and think. If then they take no pains as to the way of saying it, I do not understand why they should be read, unless so far as those of the same opinions read one another. As, while all, even those who do not agree with them, or care very little about their opinions, read Plato and the rest of the Socratic school and their successors, none but their own disciples ever take up a book of Epicurus or Metrodorus, so these Latin writers are read only by those who are in harmony with them. But to me it seems fitting that whatever is committed to writing should be prepared with a view to its being read by all men of learning ; and even if one cannot fully reach this end, I feel that it should none the less be aimed at. I therefore have always been pleased with the cus-torn of the Peripatetic and Academic philosophers, that of discussing both sides of every question, not merely because there is no other way of ascertaining what is probable, but because this method furnishes the best exercise for speaking, the opportunity for which was first made availing by Aristotle, and then by those who followed him. Within my memory Philo, whom I often heard, used to make an arrangement at certain times to teach rhetoric, at other times philosophy. I have been induced by my friends to adopt this method for the time that we have spent together at Tusculum. Thus, having given the forenoon to speaking, as we did on the previous day, in the afternoon we went down into the Academy, in which I will give you our discussion, not in a narrative form, but, as nearly as possible, in the very words employed on either side.



§10. Est igitur ambulantibus ad hunc modum sermo ille nobis institutus et a tali quodam ductus exordio:

A. Dici non potest quam sim hesterna disputatione tua delectatus vel potius adiutus. Etsi enim mihi sum conscius numquam me nimis vitae cupidum fuisse, tamen interdum obiiciebatur animo metus quidam et dolor cogitanti fore aliquando finem huius lucis et amissionem omnium vitae commodorum. Hoc genere molestiae sic, mihi crede, sum liberatus, ut nihil minus curandum putem.

§11. M. Minime mirum id quidem. Nam efficit hoc philosophia: medetur animis, inanes sollicitudines detrahit, cupiditatibus liberat, pellit timores. Sed haec eius vis non idem potest apud omnes; tum valet multum, cum est idoneam complexa naturam. "Fortes" enim non modo "fortuna adiuvat", ut est in vetere proverbio, sed multo magis ratio, quae quibusdam quasi praeceptis confirmat vim fortitudinis. Te natura excelsum quendam videlicet et altum et humana despicientem genuit, itaque facile in animo forti contra mortem habita insedit oratio. Sed haec eadem num censes apud eos ipsos valere nisi admodum paucos, a quibus inventa, disputata, conscripta sunt? Quotus enim quisque philosophorum invenitur, qui sit ita moratus, ita animo ac vita constitutus, ut ratio postulat? qui disciplinam suam non ostentationem scientiae, sed legem vitae putet? qui obtemperet ipse sibi et decretis suis pareat?

§12. Videre licet alios tanta levitate et iactatione, ut eis fuerit non didicisse melius, alios pecuniae cupidos, gloria non nullos, multos libidinum servos, ut cum eorum vita mirabiliter pugnet oratio. Quod quidem mihi videtur esse turpissimum. Ut enim, si grammaticum se professus quispiam barbare loquatur, aut si absurde canat is qui se haberi velit musicum, hoc turpior sit quod in eo ipso peccet cuius profitetur scientiam, sic philosophus in vitae ratione peccans hoc turpior est quod in officio cuius magister esse vult, labitur artemque vitae professus delinquit in vita.

4. The true work of philosophy, though not always wrought for philosophers themselves.

4. Our conversation was thus held while we were walking, and began somewhat in this way.

A. It is impossible to say how much I was delighted, or rather helped, by your yesterday's discussion ; for though I am conscious of never having been over-desirous of life, yet I sometimes felt a certain dread and pain in the thought that there must at one day be an end of its light and a loss of all its comforts. Believe me, I am so entirely freed from trouble of this kind, that there is nothing that now seems to me less worth my care.

M. This is by no means wonderful ; for such is the work of philosophy. It cures souls, draws off vain anxieties, confers freedom from desires, drives away fears. But this efficacy which belongs to it is not equally availing with all; it accomplishes the most when it takes hold of a congenial nature. Not only does Fortune, as the old proverb says, help the brave ; Reason does so still more, by certain of her precepts, so to speak, intensifying the force of that which is already brave. Nature, forsooth, made you aspiring, and lofty of spirit, and disposed to look down on human fortunes, and thus a discourse aimed against the fear of death found its easy lodgment in so brave a soul. But do you suppose that these same considerations would be of avail, save in exceedingly few cases, with the very men who have thought them out, and reasoned about them, and committed them to writing ? How few philosophers are to be found who are such in character, so ordered in soul and in life, as reason demands ; who regard their teaching not as a display of knowledge, but as the rule of life; who obey themselves, and submit to their own decrees ! You see some of them so frivolous and boastful that it were better if they had remained unlearned, some greedy of money, some of fame, some the slaves of lust, so that there is an amazing contrast between their teaching and their living, which indeed seems to me in the lowest degree disgraceful. For as when one who professes to be a grammarian talks inelegantly, or when one who wants to he considered as a musician sings out of time and tune,1 he disgraces himself all the more for his failure in that in which he pretends to be a proficient, so the philosopher who is faulty in his manner of living is worthy of the greater infamy, because he fails in duty of which he desires to be a teacher, and while professing the art of true living, is delinquent in the practice of that art.


V. A. Nonne verendum est igitur, si est ita, ut dicis, ne philosophiam falsa gloria exornes? Quod est enim maius argumentum nihil eam prodesse quam quosdam perfectos philosophos turpiter vivere?

§13. M. Nullum vero id quidem argumentum est. Nam ut agri non omnes frugiferi sunt qui coluntur, falsumque illud Accii:

Probae etsi in segetem sunt deteriorem datae
Fruges, tamen ipsae suapte natura enitent,
sic animi non omnes culti fructum ferunt. Atque, ut in eodem simili verser, ut ager quamvis fertilis sine cultura fructuosus esse non potest, sic sine doctrina animus; ita est utraque res sine altera debilis. Cultura autem animi philosophia est; haec extrahit vitia radicitus et praeparat animos ad satus accipiendos eaque mandat eis et, ut ita dicam, serit, quae adulta fructus uberrimos ferant. Agamus igitur, ut coepimus. Dic, si vis, de quo disputari velis.

§14. A. Dolorem existimo maximum malorum omnium.

M. Etiamne malus quam dedecus?

A. Non audeo id dicere equidem, et me pudet tam cito de sententia esse deiectam.

M. Magis esset pudendum, si in sententia permaneres. Quid enim minus est dignum, quam tibi peius quicquam videri dedecore, flagitio, turpitudine? quae ut effugias, quis est non modo recusandus, sed non ultro adpetendus, subeundus, excipiendus dolor?

A. Ita prorsus existimo. Quare ne sit sane summum malum dolor, malum certe est.

M. Videsne igitur, quantum breviter admonitus de doloris terrore deieceris?

§15. A. Video plane, sed plus desidero.

M. Experiar equidem; sed magna res est, animoque mihi opus est non repugnante.

A. Habebis id quidem. Ut enim heri feci, sic nunc rationem, quo ea me cumque ducet, sequar.

5. The thesis for discussion, — "Pain is the greatest of all evils."

5. A. If what you say is true, is there not fear that you may be decking philosophy with a glory that does not belong to it? For what stronger proof can there be of its uselessness than that some accomplished philosophers lead disgraceful lives ?

M. It is no proof at all; for as all cultivated fields are not harvest-yielding, and as there is no truth in what Attius says,—

"Though seed be sown on unpropitious soil,
It springs and ripens by its innate virtue,"
- [From the Atreus of Attius]
so all cultivated minds do not bear fruit. To continue the figure : as a field, though fertile, cannot yield a harvest without cultivation, no more can the mind without learning ; thus each is feeble without the other. But philosophy is the culture of the soul. It draws out vices by the root, prepares the mind to receive seed, and commits to it, and, so to speak, sows in it what, when grown, may bear the most abundant fruit. Let us go on then as we began. Name, if you please, the subject which you wish to hear discussed.

A. I think pain the greatest of all evils.

M. Greater than disgrace ?

A. That indeed I dare not affirm; and yet I am ashamed to be so soon thrown down from my position.

M. It would have been a greater shame to have maintained it ; for what is more unworthy than that anything should seem to you worse than disgrace, crime, baseness ? • To escape these what pain should be not only not shunned, but voluntarily sought, endured, welcomed ?

A. So I am now inclined to think. But if pain be not indeed the greatest evil, it is certainly an evil.

M. Do you not see then how much of the fear-fulness of pain you have thrown aside on account of the few words that I have spoken ?

A. I see it plainly ; but I want more.

M. I will attempt to give, you more ; but?I need on your part a mind not unwilling.

A. That you shall have indeed ; for. as I did yesterday, I will now follow Reason whithersoever she shall lead me.


VI. M. Primum igitur de imbecillitate multorum et de variis disciplinis philosophorum loquar. Quorum princeps et auctoritate et antiquitate, Socraticus Aristippus, non dubitavit summum malum dolorem dicere. Deinde ad hanc enervatam muliebremque sententiam satis docilem se Epicurus praebuit. Hunc post Rhodius Hieronymus dolore vacare summum bonum dixit; tantum in dolore duxit mali. Ceteri praeter Zenonem, Aristonem, Pyrrhonem idem fere, quod modo tu, malum illud quidem, sed alia peiora.

§16. Ergo, id quod natura ipsa et quaedam generosa virtus statim respuit, ne scilicet dolorem summum malum diceres oppositoque dedecore sententia depellerere, in eo magistra vitae philosophia tot saecula permanet. Quod huic officium, quae laus, quod decus erit tanti, quod adipisci cum dolore corporis velit, qui dolorem summum malum sibi esse persuaserit? quam porro quis ignominiam, quam turpitudinem non pertulerit, ut effugiat dolorem, si id summum malum esse decreverit? quis autem non miser non modo tunc, cum premetur summis doloribus, si in his est summum malum, sed etiam cum sciet id sibi posse evenire? et quis est, cui non possit? Ita fit ut omnino nemo esse possit beatus.

§17. Metrodorus quidem perfecte eum beatum putat, cui corpus bene constitutum sit et exploratum ita semper fore. Quis autem est iste, cui id exploratum possit esse?

6. Philosophers who have taken that ground.

6. M. First then I will speak of the weakness of many philosophers of various schools, of whom the foremost both in authority and in antiquity, Aristippus, the disciple of Socrates, did not hesitate to call pain the greatest of evils. Then to this nerveless and womanish opinion Epicurus offered himself a ready disciple. After him Hieronymus of Rhodes said that the supreme good implies exemption from pain, so much of evil did he regard as being included in pain. Others, with the exception of Zeno, Aristo and Pyrrho, have taken nearly the same ground with you, that pain is indeed an evil, but that there are other things that are worse. Is it then true, that Philosophy, the mistress of life, persists for so many ages in maintaining what Nature herself and a certain generous feeling of the virtuous mind so loathe and spurn, that you could not regard pain as the greatest evil, but were driven from that opiuiou the moment that the alternative of pain or disgrace was presented ? What duty, what merit, what honor can be so great that he who shall have persuaded himself that pain is the greatest evil, will iucur bodily pain for its sake ? Then again, what ignominy, what degradation will not one endure to escape pain, if he shall have determined pain to be the greatest of evils ? Still farther, who is there that is not miserable, not only in the future when he shall be weighed down by the utmost severity of pain, if he thinks it the greatest of evils, but even in the mere knowledge that such may be his lot ? And who is there to whom this may not happen ? With this possibility no person whatsoever can be happy. Metrodorus, indeed, thinks him perfectly happy whose body is in a good condition, and who is sure that it will always be so. But who is there that can be sure of this ?


VII. Epicurus vero ea dicit, ut mihi quidem risus captare videatur. Adfirmat enim quodam loco, si uratur sapiens, si crucietur - exspectas fortasse dum dicat: "patietur, perferet, non succumbet"; magna mehercule laus et eo ipso, per quem iuravi, Hercule, digna! - sed Epicuro, homini aspero et duro, non est hoc satis; in Phalaridis tauro si erit, dicet: "Quam suave est, quam hoc non curo!" Suave etiam? an parum est, si "non amarum"? At id quidem illi ipsi, qui dolorem malum esse negant, non solent dicere cuiquam suave esse cruciari; asperum, difficile, odiosum, contra naturam dicunt nec tamen malum. Hic qui solum hoc malum dicit et malorum omnium extremum, sapientem censet id suave dicturum.

§18. Ego a te non postulo, ut dolorem eisdem verbis adficias quibus Epicurus voluptatem, homo, ut scis, voluptarius. Ille dixerit sane idem in Phalaridis tauro, quod si esset in lectulo; ego tantam vim non tribuo sapientiae contra dolorem. Sit fortis in perferendo, officio satis est; ut laetetur etiam, non postulo. Tristis enim res est sine dubio, aspera, amara, inimica naturae, ad patiendum tolerandumque difficilis.

§19. Aspice Philoctetam, cui concedendum est gementi; ipsum enim Herculem viderat in Oeta magnitudine dolorum eiulantem. Nihil igitur hunc virum sagittae quas ab Hercule acceperat tum consolabantur cum

E viperino morsu venae viscerum
Veneno inbutae taetros cruciatus cient.
Itaque exclamat auxilium expetens, mori cupiens:
Heu! qui salsis fluctibus mandet
Me ex sublimo vertice saxi?
iam iam absumor, conficit animam
Vis vulneris, ulceris aestus.
Difficile dictu videtur eum non in malo esse, et magno quidem qui ita clamare cogatur.
7. Inconsistency of Epicurus.

7. But Epicurus says what seems to have been designed to provoke laughter; for in one place he says, "If a wise man is burned or put to torture" — you expect him to add, it may be, "He will endure it, he will bear it to the end, he will not yield to it," which, by Hercules, would be a great merit, and worthy of the very Hercules by whom I swear ; but for Epicurus, rough and hard man as he is, this is not enough ; — "If he shall be in the bull of Phalaris, he will say, How sweet this is ! How utterly indifferent to me ! " Sweet, forsooth ? Is it too little for one not to find it bitter ? But the very persons who deny that pain is an evil are not wont to say that it is sweet for any one to be tortured. They say that it is vexatious, hard to bear, annoying, contrary to nature, yet not an evil. Meanwhile he who calls pain the only evil and the extreme of all evils, thinks that a wise man will call it sweet. I do not ask of you that you should define pain by the same terms by which Epicurus, a voluptuary, as you know, designates pleasure. He indeed would have said the same things in the bull of Phalaris which he would have said in bed. I do not ascribe to wisdom such power against pain. That one be brave in enduring it, is enough for duty ; I do not ask that he should rejoice in it. It is doubtless a sad thing, vexatious, bitter, hostile to nature, difficult to be borne and endured. Look at Philoctetes. We must grant him the liberty of groaning ; for he has heard Hercules himself howling on Mount Oeta[*] in the greatness of his sufferings. The arrows which Hercules gave him, therefore, afford him no comfort when

"From viper's bite the veins imbned with poison
Throb in the entrails with intensest torture ;"
and so he cries, craving help, and longing to die,
"Oh who will hurl me from the lofty cliff
Into the waves that dash against its base?
I perish even now ; the burning wound
Consumes my soul in hopeless agony."
  - [Attius, Philoctetes]
It seems hard to say that he who is forced to utter such cries is not suffering evil, and indeed great evil.


VIII. §20. Sed videamus Herculem ipsum qui tum dolore frangebatur, cum immortalitatem ipsa morte quaerebat. Quas hic voces apud Sophoclem in Trachiniis edit! cui cum Deianira sanguine Centauri tinctam tunicam induisset inhaessissetque ea visceribus, ait ille:

O multa dictu gravia, perpessu aspera,
Quae corpore exanclata atque animo pertuli!
Nec mihi iunonis terror implacabilis
Nec tantum invexit tristis Eurystheus mali,
Quantum una vaecors Oenei partu edita.
Haec me inretivit veste furiali inscium,
Quae latere inhaerens morsu lacerat viscera
Urgensque graviter pulmonum haurit spiritus;
iam decolorem sanguinem omnem exorbuit.
Sic corpus clade horribili absumptum extabuit,
Ipse illigatus peste interimor textili.
Hos non hostilis dextra, non Terra edita
Moles Gigantum, non biformato impetu
Centaurus ictus corpori inflixit meo,
Non Graia vis, non barbara ulla inmanitas,
Non saeva terris gens relegata ultimis,
Quas peragrans undique omnem ecferitatem expuli,
Sed feminae vir feminea interimor manu.
8. Lamentation of Hercules on Mount Oeta, from the Trachiniae of Sophocles.

8. But let us look at Hercules when broken down, by pain, while by death itself he was seeking immortality. What are the words which Sophocles puts into his lips in the Trachiniae? When Dejanira had put upon him the garment that had been dipped in the Centaur's, blood, and it stuck to his entrails, he says : —

"What woes unspeakable and past endurance
Have racked my body and my soul tormented !
Not Juno's wrath nor vengeful Eurystheus
Could heap such tortures on my suffering frame
As Oeneus' mad daughter piles upon me.
She snared me with the fury-woven shirt,
Which, cleaving to my side, my entrails tears,
Draws panting breath from palpitating lungs,
And from my burning veins sucks out the blood.
My body putrifies in noisome gore,
And in this textile plague fast bound, I perish.
No hand of enemy, nor earth-born giant,
Nor bi-formed Centaur with impetuous rush,
By spear or battle-axe has laid me low ;
Nor Grecian force ; nor savage cruelty,
Nor the fierce races among which I journeyed,
To give them laws, and teach them arts humane, —
A man, by woman's hand I meanly die.



O nate! vere hoc nomen usurpa patri,
Ne me occidentem matris superet caritas.
Huc arripe ad me manibus abstractam piis;
iam cernam, mene an illam potiorem putes.


Perge, aude, nate, illacrima patris pestibus,
Miserere! Gentes nostras flebunt miserias.
Heu! virginalem me ore ploratum edere,
Quem vidit nemo ulli ingemescentem malo!
Ecfeminata virtus adflicta occidit.
Accede, nate, adsiste, miserandum aspice
Evisceratum corpus laceratum patris!
Videte, cuncti, tuque, caelestum sator,
iace, obsecro, in me vim coruscam fulminis!
Nunc, nunc dolorum anxiferi torquent vertices,
Nunc serpit ardor. O ante victrices manus,


O pectora, o terga, o lacertorum tori!
Vestrone pressu quondam Nemeaeus leo
Frendens efflavit graviter extremum halitum?
Haec dextra Lernam taetra mactata excetra
Pacavit? haec bicorporem adiflixit manum?
Erymanthiam haec vastificam abiecit beluam?
Haec e Tartarea tenebrica abstractum plaga
Tricipitem eduxit Hydra generatum canem?
Haec interemit tortu multiplicabili
Draconem auriferam optutu adservantem arborem?
Multa alia victrix nostra lustravit manus,
Nec quisquam e nostris spolla cepit laudibus.

Possumusne nos contemnere dolorem, cum ipsum Herculem tam intoleranter dolere videamus?

9. The same, continued.


"My son, of thy true fatherhood give proof,
Nor let a mother's love make void my prayer.
With pious hands bring her for my revenge, —
Thus show if she or I prevail with thee.
Behold, my son have pity on thy father.
Nations shall mourn my fate, that he who quailed not
Before the direst forms of mortal ill
Now like a hapless maiden weeps forlorn, —
Valor till now unconquered, nerveless, powerless.
Come, son, stand by. Thy father's wretched body
See torn and disembowelled. Look ye all.
And thou, the father of the host of heaven,
Launch upon me thy flaming thunderbolt.
Now creeps the hidden fire through all my bones ;
Now writhe my limbs in agony. Oh hands,
Oh brawny breast, oh arms that never
Of victory failed, strangled in your embrace
The lion of Nemea ceased to breathe ;
By this right hand the Lernean hydra fell ;
To this the Centaur host succumbed in battle ;
This laid in dust the Erymanthian boar ;
This from Tartarean darkness dragged to light
The triple-headed dog that guards its portal ;
This slew the unslumbering dragon by the tree
Where hung the golden apples. Other deeds
Unnumbered bear the record of my prowess,
Nor was a trophy ever taken from me."
Can we despise pain, when we see even Hercules suffering so impatiently ?


X. §23. Veniat Aeschylus, non poeta solum, sed etiam Pythagoreus; sic enim accepimus. Quo modo fert apud eum Prometheus dolorem, quem excipit ob furtum Lemnium!

Unde ignis cluet mortalibus clam
Divisus; eum doctus Prometheus
Clepsisse dolo poenasque iovi
Fato expendisse supremo.
Has igitur poenas pendens adfixus ad Causacum dicit haec:
Titanum suboles, socia nostri sanguinis,
Generata Caelo, aspicite religatum asperis
Vinctumque saxis, navem ut horrisono freto
Noctem paventes timidi adnectunt navitae.
Saturnius me sic infixit iuppiter,
iovisque numen Mulciberi ascivit manus.
Hos ille cuneos fabrica crudeli inserens
Perrupit artus; qua miser sollertia
Transverberatus castrum hoc Furiarum incolo.


Iam tertio me quoque funesto die
Tristi advolatu aduncis lacerans unguibus
iovis satelles pastu dilaniat fero.
Tum iecore opimo farta et satiata adfatim
Clangorem fundit vastum et sublime avolans
Pinnata cauda nostrum adulat sanguinem.
Cum vero adesum inflatu renovatumst iecur,
Tum rursum taetros avida se ad pastus refert.
Sic hanc custodem maesti cruciatus alo,
Quae me perenni vivum foedat miseria.
Namque, ut videtis, vinclis constrictus iovis
Arcere nequeo diram volucrem a pectore.


Sic me ipse viduus pestes excipio anxias
Amore mortis terminum anquirens mali,
Sed longe a leto numine aspellor iovis.
Atque haec vetusta saeclis glomerata horridis
Luctifica clades nostro infixa est corpori,
E quo liquatae solis ardore excidunt
Guttae, quae saxa adsidue instillant Caucasi.
Vix igitur posse videmur ita adfectum non miserum dicere et, si hunc miserum, certe dolorem malum.
10. Lamentation of Prometheus on Mount Caucasus, from Aeschylus.

10. Let us now listen to Aeschylus, who was not only a poet, but, as we are told, a disciple of Pythagoras. How does he make Prometheus bear the pain inflicted on him for his theft at Lemnos, "

Whence fire was first dispensed for mortal use ?
Prometheus stole it from the forge of Vulcan,
And for his craft, by the decree of Jove,
He paid in full the grievous penalty."
  - [not from Aescheylus, but Attius' Philoctetes]
Under this sentence, nailed to Caucasus, he says, —
"Oh heaven-born Titans, partners of my blood,
Behold your brother bound to flinty rocks.
As timid sailors fasten ships by night
With line and anchor when the waves dash high,
So has the son of Saturn nailed me here
By iron-working Vulcan's power and skill.
These spikes with cruel cunning he has driven
Through flesh and bone into the beetling cliff ;
And in this camp of Furies I must dwell.
Each third day, as it dawns, with fateful wing
Jove's carrion bird fastens his talons on me,
And fiercely feeds upon my quivering entrails ;
Then with my liver crammed and satiate,
With hideous shriek he takes his flight on high,
And brushes with his tail my trickling blood.
Then as my liver grows he comes again,
And fills and stuffs anew his hateful maw.
Thus feed I still this keeper of my prison,
Whose gluttony is my unceasing woe ;
For, as you see, in adamantine bonds,
I cannot drive the foul bird from my breast.
So on this lonely crag I bear my torment,
Praying for death to close my term of ill.
But far from death the will of Jove repels me.
This ancient doom, through centuries of horror,
Has held me in its grasp since first the snow,
Thawed by the sun-heat on the mountain's summit,
Coursed down the rugged sides of Caucasus."
  - [possibly from a lost work of Aeschylus, Prometheus Unbound]
It seems hardly possible not to call such a sufferer miserable ; and if we call him miserable, we must admit that pain is an evil.


XI. §26. A. Tu quidem adhuc meam causam agis; sed hoc mox videro, interea, unde isti versus? non enim adgnosco.

M. Dicam hercle; etenim recte requiris. Videsne abundare me otio?

A. Quid tum?

M. Fuisti saepe, credo, cum Athenis esses, in scholis philosophorum.

A. Vero, ac libenter quidem.

M. Animadvertebas igitur, etsi tam nemo erat admodum copiosus, verum tamen versus ab eis admisceri orationi.

A. Ac multos quidem a Dionysio Stoico.

M. Probe dicis. Sed is quasi dictata, nullo dilectu, nulla elegantia, Philo et proprium numerum et lecta poemata et loco adiungebat. Itaque postquam adamavi hanc quasi senilem declamationem, studiose equidem utor nostris poetis ; sed sicubi illi defecerunt, verti enim multa de Graecis, ne quo ornamento in hoc genere disputationis careret Latina oratio.

§27. Sed videsne, poetae quid mali adferant? Lamentantes inducunt fortissimos viros, molliunt animos nostros, ita sunt deinde dulces, ut non legantur modo, sed etiam ediscantur. Sic ad malam domesticam disciplinam vitamque umbratilem et delicatam cum accesserunt etiam poetae, nervos omnes virtutis elidunt. Recte igitur a Platone eiiciuntur ex ea civitate quam finxit ille, cum optimos mores et optimum rei publicae statum exquireret. At vero nos, docti scilicet a Graecia, haec a pueritia et legimus et ediscimus, hanc eruditionem liberalem et doctrinam putamus.

11. Wrong notions propagated by the poets, whom Plato therefore excludes from his ideal republic.

11. A. You are thus far on my side; but by and by I shall know what you have in mind. Meanwhile, whence came these verses ? [i.e., in the Latin translation quoted by Cicero] for I do not recognize them.

M. I will tell you, by Hercules ; for you are in the right in asking. Do you not see that I have ample leisure ?

A. What then ?

M. When you were in Athens, you frequented, I think, the schools of the philosophers.

A. I did, and very gladly.

M. Did you not notice that, though none of them then were very fluent speakers, yet they always quoted poetry in their lectures ?

A. Yes, and especially Dionysius the Stoic.

M. You are right. But he repeated verses by rote, as if they were dictated by some one else, with neither appropriateness nor elegance. On the other hand, my friend Philo used to quote a fitting number of choice poetical passages, and always to the point. In like manner, since I adopted this style of senile declamation, as one might call it, I am fond of making such use of our native poets ; and when they have failed me, I have often translated from the Greek, so that I might not be forced in discussions of this sort to employ directly any, other than our own Latin tongue. But do you not see what mischief the poets are doing ? They introduce the bravest men as indulging in lamentation. They make our souls effeminate. Then, too, their strains are so sweet, that, not, content with reading them, we even commit them to memory. Thus the poets have enhanced the influence of our bad domestic discipline and our easy and luxurious modes of living, so as to enfeeble all the nerves of courage. Poets were therefore rightly excluded by Plato from his ideal commonwealth, since he required there the highest type of morals and the best condition of public affairs. But we, deriving our instruction from Greece, read and learn these poems even from boyhood; and this we account, as liberal learning and culture.


XII. §28. Sed quid poetis irascimur? Virtutis magistri, philosophi inventi sunt, qui summum malum dolorem dicerent. At tu, adulescens, cum id tibi paulo ante dixisses videri, rogatus a me, etiamne maius quam dedecus, verbo de sententia destitisti. Roga hoc idem Epicurum; maius dicet esse malum mediocrem dolorem quam maximum dedecus; in ipso enim dedecore mali nihil esse, nisi sequantur dolores. Quis igitur Epicurum sequitur dolor, cum hoc ipsum dicit, summum malum esse dolorem? quo dedecus maius a philosopho nullum expecto. Quare satis mihi dedisti, cum respondisti maius tibi videri malum dedecus quam dolorem. Hoc ipsum enim si tenebis, intelleges quam sit obsistendum dolori; nec tam quaerendum est dolor malumne sit, quam firmandus animus ad dolorem ferendum.

§29. Concludunt ratiunculas Stoici, cur non sit malum; quasi de verbo, non de re laboretur. Quid me decipis, Zeno? Nam cum id, quod mihi horribile videtur, tu omnino malum negas esse, capior et scire cupio quo modo id quod ego miserrimum existimem ne malum quidem sit. "Nihil est", inquit, "malum, nisi quod turpe atque vitiosum est". Ad ineptias redis. Illud enim, quod me angebat, non eximis. Scio dolorem non esse nequitiam; desine id me docere; hoc doce doleam necne doleam, nihil interesse. "Numquam quicquam", inquit, "ad beate quidem vivendum, quod est in una virtute positum ; sed est tamen reiiciendum". Cur? "Asperum est, contra naturam, difficile perpessu, triste, durum".

12. On this subject they have been too well seconded by philosophers.

12. But why are we angry with the poets ? Philosophers, masters of virtue, have been found ready to call pain the greatest of evils. But you, young man, immediately after expressing yourself thus, when I asked you whether pain is a greater evil than disgrace, receded from your opinion at a word. I put the same question to Epicurus, and he will say that a moderate degree of pain is a greater evil than the greatest disgrace, inasmuch as there is no evil in disgrace, unless it be followed by pain. What pain then follows Epicurus for making this very assertion that pain is the greatest of evils, for which I can look for nothing more deeply disgraceful from a philosopher ? You therefore conceded enough for me when you replied that disgrace seemed to you a greater evil than pain ; for if you hold fast to this opinion, you will understand how pain is to be resisted, nor is it so important a question whether pain is an evil, as how the soul may be strengthened to bear it. The Stoics give paltry reasons why pain is not an evil, as if the question were one about a term, not about the thing itself. Why do you deceive me, Zeno ? For I am taken in by you when you deny that what seems to be the object of intensest dread is in any degree an evil ; and I want to know how it is that what I regard as the extreme of misery is not an evil in any wise. "Nothing," says he, "is evil except what is base and vicious." But I reply, You return to empty words ; for you do not take away the cause of my uneasiness. I know that wickedness and pain are not the same thing. Cease to insist on this ; but teach me that it makes no difference to me whether I have pain or do not have it. " This," he replies, "has no bearing on the happiness of life, which depends on virtue alone; yet still pain is to be shunned." Why? "It is annoying, contrary to nature, difficult to bear, sad, hard."


XIII. §30. Haec est copia verborum, quod omnes uno verbo malum appellamus, id tot modis posse dicere. Definis tu mihi, non tollis dolorem, cum dicis asperum, contra naturam vix quod ferri tolerarique possit; nec mentiris; sed re succumbere non oportebat verbis gloriantem. "Dum nihil bonum, nisi quod honestum, nihil malum, nisi quod turpe" - optare hoc quidem est, non docere. Illud et melius et verius, omnia quae natura aspernetur, in malis esse, quae adsciscat, in bonis. Hoc posito et verborum concertatione sublata tantum tamen excellet illud, quod recte amplexantur isti, quod honestum, quod rectum, quod decorum appellamus, quod idem interdum virtutis nomine amplectimur, ut omnia praeterea, quae bona corporis et fortunae putantur, perexigua et minuta videantur, ne malum quidem ullum nec si in unum locum collata omnia sint, cum turpitudinis malo comparanda.

§31. Quare si, ut initio concessisti, turpitudo peius est quam dolor, nihil est plane dolor. Nam dum tibi turpe nec dignum viro videbitur gemere, eiulare, lamentari, frangi, debilitari dolore, dum honestas, dum dignitas, dum decus aderit, tuque in ea intuens te continebis, cedet profecto virtuti dolor et animi inductione languescet. Aut enim nulla virtus est aut contemnendus omnis dolor. Prudentiamne vis esse, sine qua ne intellegi quidem ulla virtus potest? Quid ergo? ea patieturne te quicquam facere nihil proficientem et frustra laborantem, an temperantia sinet te inmoderate facere quicquam, an coli iustitia poterit ab homine propter vim doloris enuntiante commissa, prodente conscios, multa officia relinquente?

§32. Quid? fortitudini comitibusque eius, magnitudini animi, gravitati, patientiae, rerum humanarum despicientiae quo modo respondebis? adflictusne et iacens et lamentabili voce deplorans audieris: "O virum fortem!"? Te vero ita adfectum ne virum quidem quisquam dixerit. Amittenda igitur fortitudo est aut sepeliendus dolor.

13. If disgrace is worse than pain, this consideration alone puts pain in the background.

13. Here we have a multitude of words in which we may express in many different ways what we all designate by the one word, "evil." You barely define, you do not remove pain when you call it annoying, contrary to nature, difficult to be borne or tolerated. You tell the truth indeed ; but while you teach that there is nothing good save what is right, nothing evil save what is wrong, one who makes such boast in words ought not to succumb in his conduct. He who thus yields barely wishes that his words were true instead of teaching that they are true. But it is better and more true to class all things which Nature spurns as evils, all things which she approves, as among the goods. This established, and verbal disputes laid aside, that which those philosophers fitly embrace, that which we call honorable, right, becoming, and which we sometimes include under the general name of virtue, has such paramount excellence that all things beside which are regarded as goods of the body and of fortune seem very small and paltry, nor is any evil, nor are all evils, were they brought together and massed on one spot, to be compared with the evil of disgrace. Therefore if, as you admitted at the outset, disgrace is worse than pain, pain is evidently nothing. For so long as it shall seem to you disgraceful and unworthy of a man to groan, to wail, to lament, to be broken down, to be unnerved by pain ; so long as the right, dignity, honor shall be present, and you, looking steadfastly on them, shall retain your self-possession, — pain will certainly yield to virtue, and will become enfeebled by your resoluteness of soul. Indeed, either there is no such thing as virtue, or all pain is to be held in contempt. Will you put on the list of virtues prudence, without which no virtue can be even imagined ? What then ? Will that suffer you to do anything by which you effect no purpose, and give yourself trouble in vain ? Or will temperance suffer you to do anything to excess ?

Or can justice be held in reverence by a man whom the power of pain can force to declare what has been told him in confidence, to betray those whose secrets are in his keeping, or to leave unperformed duties incumbent on him ? How will you give account of yourself to courage and its associate virtues, magnanimity, seriousness of purpose, patience, contempt for the vicissitudes of human fortune? While you are beaten down, and prostrate, and wailing with cries of lamentation, will any one say to you, "Oh, brave man" ? Indeed, were you in that condition, no one would call you even a man. Courage then must be parted with, or pain must be buried.


XIV. Ecquid scis igitur, si quid de Corinthiis tuis amiseris, posse habere te reliquam supellectilem salvam, virtutem autem si unam amiseris (etsi amitti non potest virtus), sed si unam confessus eris te non habere, nullam esse te habiturum?

§33. Num igitur fortem virum, num magno animo, num patientem, num gravem, num humana contemnentem potes dicere aut Philoctetam illum -? a te enim malo discedere; sed ille certe non fortis, qui iacet

in tecto umido,
Quod eiulatu, questu, gemitu, fremitibus
Resonando mutum flebiles voces refert.
Non ego dolorem dolorem esse nego (cur enim fortitudo desideraretur?), sed eum opprimi dico patientia, si modo est aliqua patientia; si nulla est, quid exornamus philosophiam aut quid eius nomine gloriosi sumus? Pungit dolor, vel fodiat sane; si nudus es, da iugulum; sin tectus "vulcaniis armis", id est fortitudine, resiste; haec enim te, nisi ita facies, custos dignitatis relinquet et deseret.

§34. Cretum quidem leges, quas sive iuppiter sive Minos sanxit de iovis quidem sententia, ut poetae ferunt, itemque Lycurgi laboribus erudiunt iuventutem, venando currendo, esuriendo sitiendo, algendo aestuando. Spartae vero pueri ad aram sic verberibus accipiuntur, Ut multus e visceribus sanguis exeat, non numquam etiam, ut, cum ibi essem, audiebam, ad necem; quorum non modo nemo exclamavit umquam, sed ne ingemuit quidem. Quid ergo? hoc pueri possunt, viri non poterunt? et mos valet, ratio non valebit?

14. Pain subdued by courage and patience.

14. Were you to lose one of your Corinthian vases, you might have the rest of your furniture safe; but do you not know that if you.shall have lost one virtue (although virtue cannot be lost), or I would rather say, if you must confess that you lack one virtue, yon will have no virtue at all? Can you then call that Philoctetes in the play (for I would rather take an example other than yourself) a brave man, or a man of great soul, or patient, or of a substantial character, or in a position to despise human fortunes ? Certainly he is not brave who lies on

"A couch bedewed with tears, from which resound
Unceasing tones of querulous complaint,
Groans, sobs, and howls of bitter agony."
  - [probably from Attius' Philoctetes]
I do not deny that pain is pain ; else where were the need of fortitude ? But I do say that pain is subdued by patience, if patience be a real quality; and if it be not, why do we lavish praises on philosophy ? Or what is there to boast of in its name ? Pain pricks ; let it even pierce deep. If you are without defence, offer your throat to its assault. But if you are shielded by the Vulcanian armor of courage, resist ; for unless as a keeper of your own dignity you make such resistance, courage will leave and desert you. The laws of the Cretans indeed, enacted, as the poets say, either by Jupiter, or by Minos under Jupiter's inspiration, and the laws of Lycurgus also, train youth by laborious exercises, by hunting, by running, by enduring hunger and thirst, cold and heat. The Spartan boys under these laws are so scourged at the altar as to occasion copious internal bleeding, and sometimes, as I heard when I was at Sparta, are whipped to death ; yet not one of them ever cried out, or groaned. What then ? Are boys capable of this, and shall not men be ? Still farther, does custom have such force, and shall not reason be of equal avail ?


XV. §35. Interest aliquid inter laborem et dolorem. Sunt finitima omnino, sed tamen differt aliquid. Labor est functio quaedam vel animi vel corporis gravioris operis et muneris, dolor autem motus asper in corpore alienus a sensibus. Haec duo Graeci illi, quorum copiosior est lingua quam nostra, uno nomine appellant. Itaque industrios homines illi studiosos vel potius amantis doloris appellant, nos commodius laboriosos; aliud est enim laborare, aliud dolere. O verborum inops interdum, quibus abundare te semper putas, Graecia! Aliud, inquam, est dolere, aliud laborare. Cum varices secabantur C. Mario, dolebat; cum aestu magno ducebat agmen, laborabat. Est inter haec quaedam tamen similitudo; consuetudo enim laborum perpessionem dolorum efficit faciliorem.

§36. Itaque illi qui Graeciae formam rerum publicarum dederunt, corpora iuvenum firmari labore voluerunt. Quod Spartiatae etiam in feminas transtulerunt quae ceteris in urbibus mollissimo cultu "parietum umbris occuluntur". Illi autem voluerunt nihil horum simile esse

apud Lacaenas virgines
Quibus magis palaestra, Eurota, sol, pulvis, labor,
Militia in studio est quam fertilitas barbara.
Ergo his laboriosis exercitationibus et dolor intercurrit non numquam, impelluntur, feriuntur, abiiciuntur, cadunt, et ipse labor quasi callum quoddam obducit dolori.
15. Resemblance and difference between labor and pain.

15. There is some difference between labor and pain. They are near kindred, but yet not altogether alike. Labor is a certain function of either body or mind, of somewhat grave amount and importance ; while pain is a rude disturbance in the body, disagreeable to the senses. These two things the Greeks, whose language is more copious than ours, call by one name. [i.e., πονοϛ, (ponos), which means either labor or pain] Thus they call industrious men not only busy, but painstaking [i.e., φιλοπονοϛ, (philoponos), the love of toil]; we more fitly term them laborious. For labor is one thing; pain another. Oh Greece, sometimes poor in words, in which you always regard yourself as abounding ! It is, I say, one thing to be in pain; another to labor. When Caius Marius had his varicose veins lanced, he was in pain ; when he led his army in a time of intense heat, he labored. Yet there is a certain likeness between the two ; for the habit of labor makes the endurance of pain the easier. Therefore those who gave Greece her republican institutions provided that the bodies of young men should be strengthened by labor. The Spartans transferred this same discipline to the women, who in other cities are hidden within the walls of their houses and are accustomed to the most delicate modes of living. The Lacedaemonians determined that there should be nothing of this kind —

"Among the Spartan virgins, who delight
In swimming, wrestling, toil, and dust, and sun,
More than in gentler cares of motherhood."
   - [From the Meleager of Attius]
In these toilsome exercises pain sometimes intervenes. They are pushed, struck, thrown down ; they have heavy falls ; and labor itself produces a certain insensibility to pain.


XVI. §37. Militiam vero - nostram dico, non Spartiatarum, quorum procedit ad modum acies ac tibiam, nec adhibetur ulla sine anapaestis pedibus hortatio; nostri exercitus primum unde nomen habeant, vides; deinde qui labor, quantus agminis: ferre plus dimidiati mensis cibaria, ferre, si quid ad usum velint ferre vallum; nam scutum, gladium, galeam in onere nostri milites non plus numerant quam umeros, lacertos, manus. Arma enim membra militis esse dicunt; quae quidem ita geruntur apte, ut si usus fuerit, abiectis oneribus expeditis armis ut membris pugnare possint. Quid? exercitatio legionum, quid? ille cursus, concursus, clamor quanti laboris est! Ex hoc ille animus in proeliis paratus ad vulnera. Adduc pari animo inexercitatum militem, mulier videbitur.

§38. Cur tantum interest inter novum et veterem exercitum quantum experti sumus? Aetas tironum plerumque melior, sed ferre laborem, contemnere vulnus consuetudo docet. Quin etiam videmus ex acie efferri saepe sancios, et quidem rudem illum et inexercitatum quamvis levi ictu ploratus turpissimos edere; at vero ille exercitatus et vetus ob eamque rem fortior medicum modo requirens, a quo obligetur:

E. O Patricoles, inquit, ad vos adveniens auxilium et vestras manus
Peto, prius quam oppeto malam pestem mandatam hostili manu,
Neque sanguis ullo potis est pacto profluens consistere,
Si qui sapientia magis vestra mors devitari potest.
Namque Aesculapi liberorum saucii opplent porticus;
Non potest accedi -
P. Certe Eurypylus hic quidem est, hominem, exercitum!
16. Power of endurance developed in military service.

16. As to military service — our own I mean, not that of the Spartans, whose cohorts move to the sound of the flute, and receive no order except in anapaests — we see, in the first place, whence our armies derive their name, [Exercitus, from cxercere, to exercise] and then, what labor and how great is that of the troops on their march, as they carry more than half a month's food, and carry too whatever they need for use, and carry, beside, each a stake for a palisade. For our soldiers no longer reckon shield, sword and helmet as burdens. They say that the implements of a soldier's armor are his limbs, which indeed they carry so adroitly that, if need be, throwing aside their burdens, they can fight with weapons as freely as if they were limbs. How much labor is there in the exercise of the legions ! How much in their running, in their forming in battle array, in their shouts ! By all this their minds are prepared for wounds in battle. Bring forward an unexercised soldier of equal spirit, he will seem a mere woman. Why is there so much difference as we have found between a new and an old army ? The age of the new recruits is greatly in their favor ; but it is habit that teaches the soldier to bear labor and to think lightly of. a wound. We indeed often see the wounded carried out of the ranks, and the new and unexercised soldier, though but slightly hurt, moans most shamefully ; while he who has been exercised, and has grown old in the service, and for that very reason is the more brave, only asks for one who has skill enough to apply a bandage, as Eurypylus in the play says,

"Patroclus, I come to ask your aid
Before the hostile weapon lays me low.
Unless your greater skill suffice to stanch
The flowing blood, my life must be the forfeit ;
For wounded men so crowd upon the surgeons
That I can find no entrance to their porch."
   - [probably from the Achilles of Ennius].
Patroclus replies : —
"Eurypylus indeed, —a man well exercised,"
where so much continuous suffering is endured.


XVII. §39. Ubi tantum luctus continuatur, vide quam non flebiliter respondeat, rationem etiam adferat cur aequo animo sibi ferendum sit:

E. Qui alteri exitium parat,
Eum scire oportet sibi paratam pestem ut participet parem.
Abducet Patricoles, credo, ut collocet in cubili, ut vulnus obliget. Siquidem homo esset; sed nihil vidi minus. Quaerit enim quid actum sit:
P. Eloquere, eloquere, res Argiuum proelio ut se sustinet.
E. Non potest ecfari tantum dictis, quantum factis suppetit laboris.
P. Quiesce igitur et vulnus adliga!
Etiamsi Eurypylus posset, non posset Aesopus:
E. Ubi fortuna Hectoris nostram acrem aciem inclinatam...
et cetera explicat in dolore. Sic est enim intemperans militaris in forti viro gloria. Ergo haec veteranus miles facere poterit, doctus vir sapiensque non poterit? Ille vero melius, ac non paulo quidem.

§40. Sed adhuc de consuetudine exercitationis loquor, nondum de ratione et sapientia. Aniculae saepe inediam biduum aut triduum ferunt. Subduc cibum unum diem athletae: iovem, iovem Olympium, eum ipsum cui se exercebit, implorabit, ferre non posse clamabit. Consuetudinis magna vis est. Pernoctant venatores in nive, in montibus uri se patiantur, inde pugiles caestibus contusi ne ingemescunt quidem.

§41. Sed quid hos quibus Olympiorum victoria consulatus ille antiquus videtur? gladiatores, aut perditi homines aut barbari, quas plagas perferunt! quo modo illi, qui bene instituti sunt, accipere plagam malunt quam turpiter vitare! quam saepe apparet nihil eos malle quam vel domino satis facere vel populo! mittunt etiam vulneribus confecti ad dominos qui quaerant quid velint; si satis eis factum sit, se velle decumbere. Quis mediocris gladiator ingemuit, quis vultum mutavit umquam? quis non modo stetit, verum etiam decubuit turpiter? quis, cum decubuisset, ferrum recipere iussus collum contraxit? Tantum exercitatio, meditatio, consuetudo valet. Ergo hoc poterit

Samnis, spurcus homo, vita illa dignus locoque,
vir natus ad gloriam ullam partem animi tam mollem habebit, quam non meditatione et ratione conroboret? Crudele gladiatorum spectaculum et inhumanum non nullis videri solet, et haud scio an ita sit, ut nunc fit. Cum vero sontes ferro depugnabant, auribus fortasse multae, oculis quidem nulla poterat esse fortior contra dolorem et mortem disciplina.
17. Examples of endurance in athletes, hunters, gladiators.

17. See now how little there is that looks like weeping in his answer, — how he even adduces a reason why he should hear his fate with equanimity, —

"The man who wields the implements of death,
Should marvel not if they are turned against him."
Patroclus will, I suppose, lead him away, to put him to bed, and to bind up his wounds, if indeed he has the feelings of a man. But in the play I see in him only the soldier and the patriot ; for he proceeds to ask the wounded man the fortunes of the day : —
"Say, do the Greeks sustain themselves in battle ? "
Eurypylus replies : —
"Words have no power to tell the deeds of might
In which I bore my part till I was wounded.
But cease to question me. —
Bind up my wounds."
Yet though Eurypylus bears his sufferings patiently, Aesopus [Cicero's friend, not the Greek fable-writer] in taking this part on the stage could not ; but he uttered as one in pain,
"When Hector's fortune seemed in the ascendant,
And hardly pressed upon our yielding force,"
and the narrative that follows. Thus beyond measure is the passion for military glory in a brave man. Shall then the old soldier have this power of endurance, and shall a learned and wise man lack it ? He indeed can bear pain better, and not a little better. But I am at present speaking only of habit as formed by exercise, not yet of reason and wisdorn. Old women will often bear the lack of food for two or three days. But take food from an athlete for a single day, he will implore the very Olympian Jupiter for whose honor he is in training, and will cry that he cannot bear it.3 Great is the power of habit. Hunters pass the night in the snow, and suffer themselves to be scorched by heat on the mountains. Then again, boxers utter no groan when bruised by the caestus. What shall we say of those to whom victory in the Olympic games seems as great an honor as our consulate used to be ? Gladiators too, who are either abandoned men or barbarians, — what do they endure ! How much rather will those who have been well trained receive a wound than avoid it by any show of cowardice ! How often do they seem to have no desire except to satisfy their masters or the people ! When prostrate with wounds, they send to their masters to learn their pleasure. Unless their masters are satisfied, they are ready to lie down to die. What gladiator of moderate reputation ever groaned, or lost countenance, or showed himself a coward, as he stood in combat, or even as he lay down to die ? Or what one of them, when he had lain down and was ordered to receive the fatal stroke, ever drew his neck back? So much can exercise, thought and habit avail. Shall then
"A vulgar Samnite worthy of his calling "
  - [A verse from Lucilius]
have this power of endurance, and shall one born for glory have any part of his mind so effeminate that he cannot make it strong by reflection and reason? The gladiatorial spectacle is wont to be regarded by some as cruel and inhuman, and I know not whether, as it is now managed, it may not be so. But when criminals fought in the arena, if there may have been for the ear, there was not for the eye, any stronger discipline for the endurance of pain and death.


XVIII. §42. De exercitatione et consuetudine et commentatione dixi; age sis, nunc de ratione videamus, nisi quid vis ad haec.

A. Egone ut te interpellem? ne hoc quidem vellem; ita me ad credendum tua ducit oratio.

M. Sitne igitur malum dolere necne, Stoici viderint, qui contortulis quibusdam et minutis conclusiunculis nec ad sensus permanantibus effici volunt non esse malum dolorem. Ego illud, quicquid sit tantum esse quantum videatur non puto, falsaque eius visione et specie moveri homines dico vehementius, doloremque omnem esse tolerabilem. Unde igitur ordiar? an eadem breviter attingam quae modo dixi, quo facilius oratio progredi possit longius?

§43. Inter omnes igitur hoc constat, nec doctos homines solum, sed etiam indoctos, virorum esse fortium et magnanimorum et patientium et humana vincentium toleranter dolorem pati; nec vero quisquam fuit qui eum qui ita pateretur non laudandum putaret. Quod ergo et postulatur a fortibus et laudatur, cum fit, id aut extimescere veniens aut non ferre praesens nonne turpe est? Atqui vide ne, cum omnes rectae animi adfectiones virtutes appellentur, non sit hoc proprium nomen omnium, sed ab ea quae una ceteris excellebat, omnes nominatae sint. Appellata est enim ex viro virtus; viri autem propria maxime est fortitudo, cuius munera duo sunt maxima, mortis dolorisque contemptio. Utendum est igitur his, si virtutis compotes, vel potius si viri volumus esse, quoniam a viris virtus nomen est mutuata. Quaeres fortasse quo modo, et recte; talem enim medicinam philosophia profitetur.

18. Pain not so much in endurance as it seems in thought.

18. I have spoken of exercise, of habit, and of the mental self-possession resulting from it. Let us now consider reason, unless you have any reply to make to what I have said.

A. To interrupt you ? I should be unwilling to do so; for what you have said commands my belief.

M. Let us then leave the question whether pain is or is not an evil to the Stoics, who by subtleties and paltry word-play which cannot reach the understanding attempt to arrive at the conclusion that pain is not an evil. Whatever it may be, I do not think that it is as much as it seems, and I maintain that men are moved far more than is due by its false appearance and representation, and that all the pain that actually falls to their lot is endurable. Where then shall I commence ? Shall I touch briefly on what I have already said, that my discourse may be the more easily continued ? This then is established among all, equally the learned and the unlearned, that it is the part of brave and large-minded men, of those who are self-possessed and have risen above human vicissitudes, to endure pain without yielding to it ; nor was there ever any one who did not think the man who thus suffered worthy of praise. Is it not then disgraceful either to fear the approach or not to hear the presence of an endurance which is both demanded of the brave and praised when it is exhibited ? Consider too, since all right affections of mind are termed virtues, whether, instead of this being the proper name of them all, they did not rather take their name from that which alone excels all the rest. Virtue is derived from the word which designates a man, [from vir, which denotes a man endowed with all manly attributes] and the most characteristic property of a man is courage, of which the two greatest functions are the contempt of pain and the contempt of death. These then must be exercised, if we mean to be possessed of virtue, or rather, if we mean to be men ; since it is from men that virtue has derived its name. You will perhaps ask how this virtue is to be obtained, and rightly ; for philosophy proposes to furnish the requisite prescription.


XIX. §44. Venit Epicurus, homo minime malus vel potius vir optimus; tantum monet quantum intellegit. "Neglege", inquit, "dolorem". Quis hoc dicit? Idem qui dolorem summum malum. Vix satis constanter. Audiamus. "Si summus dolor est", inquit, "necesse est brevem esse". "Iteradum eadem ista mihi!" non enim satis intellego quid summum dicas esse, quid breve. "Summum, quo nihil sit superius, breve, quo nihil brevius. Contemno magnitudinem doloris, a qua me brevitas temporis vindicabit ante paene quam venerit". Sed si est tantus dolor quantus Philoctetae? "Bene plane magnus mihi quidem videtur, sed tamen non summus; nihil enim dolet nisi pes; possunt oculi, potest caput latera, pulmones, possunt omnia. Longe igitur abest a summo dolore. Ergo, inquit, dolor diuturnus habet laetitiae plus quam molestiae".

§45. Nunc ego non possum tantum hominem nihil sapere dicere, sed nos ab eo derideri puto. Ego summum dolorem ("summum" autem dico, etiamsi decem atomis est maior alius) non continuo esse dico brevem multosque possum bonos viros nominare, qui complures annos doloribus podagrae crucientur maximis. Sed homo catus numquam terminat nec magnitudinis nec diuturnitatis modum, ut sciam quid summum dicat in dolore, quid breve in tempore. Omittamus hunc igitur nihil prorsus dicentem cogamusque confiteri non esse ab eo doloris remedia quaerenda, qui dolorem malorum omnium maximum dixerit, quamvis idem forticulum se in torminibus et in stranguria sua praebeat. Aliunde igitur est quaerenda medicina, et maxime quidem, si quid maxime consentaneum sit, quaerimus, ab eis quibus, quod honestum sit, summum bonum, quod turpe, summum videtur malum. His tu praesentibus gemere et iactare te non audebis profecto; loquetur enim eorum voce Virtus ipsa tecum:

19. Epicurus, on pain.

19. Epicurus presents himself, — by no means a bad man, or I should rather say, a very good man. He gives advice to the extent of his knowledge. He says, "Take no notice of pain." Who is it that says so ? The same man who accounts pain the greatest of evils. He is scarcely consistent here. Let us hear him further. "If the pain be extreme, it must necessarily be brief." Repeat this to me; for I do not sufficiently understand what you call "extreme," or what you call "brief." "'Extreme' is that than which there can be nothing greater ; 'brief,' that than which there can be nothing shorter. I despise the severity of any pain from which its brief duration will deliver me almost before it comes upon me." But what if the pain is as great as that of Philoctetes? "His pain seems to me very great indeed, but not extreme. Nothing but his foot pains him. His eyes are capable of pain ; so are his head, his sides, his lungs. So is every part of his body. He is then very far from extreme pain. Therefore," says he, "long-con-tinued pain is attended with more pleasure than trouble." Now I cannot say that such a man is wholly destitute of wisdom ; but I think that he is making sport of us. I maintain that extreme pain (and so I call it even though there be other pain that is ten atoms greater) is not necessarily brief ; and I can name not a few good men who have been tormented for many years with the acutest pain from gout. But this careful man never defines the measure of either severity or duration, so as to enable me to know what is extreme in pain, what is short in time. Let us then leave him aside as saying nothing to the purpose ; and let us force him to acknowledge that the remedies of pain are not to be sought from one who regards pain as the greatest of all evils, although he may show himself somewhat brave in enduring dysentery and strangury. We must therefore seek our remedy elsewhere, and chiefly indeed, if we desire consistency, from those to whom the right seems the supreme good, the wrong the greatest of evils. In their presence you certainly will not dare to groan and to toss yourself restlessly; for Virtue herself will talk with you through their voice.


XX. §46. "Tune, cum pueros Lacedaemone, adulescentes Olympiae, barbaros in harena videris excipientis gravissimas plagas et ferentis silentio, si te forte dolor aliquis pervellerit, exclamabis ut mulier, non constanter et sedate feres?" "Fieri non potest; natura non patitur."- Audio. Pueri ferunt gloria ducti, ferunt pudore alii, multi metu, et tamen veremur, ut hoc, quod a tam multis et quod tot locis perferatur, natura patiatur? Illa vero non modo patitur, verum etiam postulat; nihil enim habet praestantius, nihil quod magis expetat quam honestatem, quam laudem, quam dignitatem, quam decus. Hisce ego pluribus nominibus unam rem declarari volo, sed utor, ut quam maxime significem, pluribus. Volo autem dicere illud homini longe optimum esse, quod ipsum sit optandum per se, a virtute profectum vel in ipsa virtute situm, sua sponte laudabile, quod quidem citius dixerim solum quam non summum bonum. Atque ut haec de honesto, sic de turpi contraria, nihil tam taetrum, nihil tam aspernandum, nihil homine indignius.

§47. Quod si tibi persuasum est (principio enim dixisti plus in dedecore mali tibi videri quam in dolore), reliquum est ut tute tibi imperes; quamquam hoc nescio quo modo dicatur. Quasi duo simus, ut alter imperet, alter pareat; non inscite tamen dicitur.

20. Virtue, personified, treats pain as of no account when compared with moral evil.

20. "When you have seen boys at Lacedaemon, youths at Olympia, barbarians in the arena, receiving the heaviest blows and bearing them in silence, will you, if any pain happens to give you a twinge, cry out like a woman ? Will you not bear it with a composed and quiet mind ?" — "It is impossible; it is more than nature can endure." — "I hear. Boys bear pain, led by the hope of fame ; others bear it from shame; many for fear; and yet do we apprehend that Nature cannot endure what is fully borne by so many and in so many situations ? Indeed, she not only bears it, but even demands it ; for she has nothing more excellent, nothing which she more earnestly craves than honor, than merit, than dignity, than gracefulness of character. By these several names I mean to express one thing ; but I use them all that I may put into my words the fullest significance possible. I want to say that by far the best thing for a man is that which is to be chosen for its own sake, that which proceeds from virtue or resides in virtue, which is praiseworthy in its very essence, which indeed I would rather call the 'only good' than not term it the 'supreme good.' Moreover, as these thiugs are true concerning the right, their opposite is true concerning the wrong. There is nothing so foul, nothing so detestable, nothing more unworthy of a man." If you believe this — and you said at the outset that there seemed to you to be more evil in disgrace than in pain—it remains that you exercise command over yourself, though I hardly know how to say this, implying as it does that we are two, one commanding, the other obeying.


XXI. Est enim animus in partis tributus duas, quarum altera rationis est particeps, altera expers. Cum igitur praecipitur ut nobismet ipsis imperemus, hoc praecipitur, ut ratio coerceat temeritatem. Est in animis omnium fere natura molle quiddam, demissum, humile, enervatum quodam modo et languidum. Si nihil esset aliud, nihil esset homine deformius; sed praesto est domina omnium et regina ratio, quae conixa per se et progressa longius fit perfecta virtus. Haec ut imperet illi parti animi quae oboedire debet, id videndum est viro.

§48. "Quonam modo?" inquies. Vel ut dominus servo vel ut imperator militi vel ut parens filio. Si turpissime se illa pars animi geret quam dixi esse mollem, si se lamentis muliebriter lacrimisque dedet, vinciatur et constringatur amicorum propinquorumque custodiis; saepe enim videmus fractos pudore, qui ratione nulla vincerentur. Ergo hos quidem ut famulos vinclis prope ac custodia, qui autem erunt firmiores nec tamen robustissimi, hos admonitu oportebit ut bonos milites revocatos dignitatem tueri. Non nimis in Niptris ille sapientissimus Graeciae saucius lamentatur vel modice potius:

Pedetemptim, inquit ite et sedato nisu,
Ne succussu arripiat maior dolor.

§49. Pacuvius hoc melius quam Sophocles (apud illum enim perquam febiliter Ulixes lamentatur in vulnere); tamen huic leviter gementi illi ipsi qui ferunt saucium, personae gravitatem intuentes non dubitant dicere:

Tu quoque, Ulixes, quamquam graviter
Cernimus ictum, nimis paene animo es
Molli, qui consuetus in armis Aevom agere...
Intellegit poeta prudens ferendi doloris consuetudinem esse non contemnendam magistram.

§50. Atque ille non inmoderate magno in dolore:

Retinete, tenete! opprimit ulcus ;
Nudate! heu miserum me! excrucior.
Incipit labi, deinde ilico desinit:
Operite, abscedite, iam iam
Mittite ; nam attrectatu et quassu
Saevum amplificatis dolorem.
Videsne ut obmutuerit non sedatus corporis, sed castigatus animi dolor? Itaque in extremis Niptris alios quoque obiurgat, idque moriens:
Conqueri fortunam adversam, non lamentari decet.
Id viri est officium, fletus muliebri ingenio additus.
Huius animi pars illa mollior rationi sic paruit, ut severo imperatori miles pudens.
21. What self-government means.

21. Yet there is scientific truth in this form of speech ; for the soul is divided into two parts, of which one possesses reason, the other lacks it. When therefore we are commanded to govern ourselves, the precept implies that reason should restrain impulse. There is naturally in the soul of almost every man something soft, low, earthy, in a certain degree nerveless and feeble. But reason is at hand, mistress and queen of all, which by its own force striving and advancing upward, becomes perfect virtue. A man must take care that this have under its command that part of the soul which ought to obey. Do you ask how ? Either as a master commands his servant, or as the general his soldier, or as a father his son. If that part of the soul which I have called "soft" shall conduct itself most disgracefully ; if it shall surrender itself effeminately to lamentation and tears,—let it be bound and constrained by the guardianship of friends and kindred ; for we often see those who could not be conquered by reason subdued by shame. Such persons must then, like slaves, be kept in bonds and under custody. But those who are more firm, yet not of the most hardy type, ought to be admonished, as good soldiers recalled to the ranks, to maintain their dignity. That wisest of the Greeks, in the Niptra [a lost tragedy of Sophocles] when wounded, laments not excessively, but rather moderately, when he says, —

"Move with slow step and at an even pace,
Lest, as you bear me, by a sudden shock
My rankling wound may give severer pain."
Pacuvius is here to be preferred to Sophocles, who makes Ulysses lament very tearfully over his wound. Yet according to Pacuvius, when he gives even slight tokens of suffering, those who are carrying the wounded man, considering his weight of character, do not hesitate to say, —
"You too, Ulysses, though severely wounded,
Yet show more tokens of a feeble soul
Than fit the soldier well inured to peril
By land and sea, in arms, of old renown."
The wise poet understands that habit is not to be despised as a master in the art of bearing pain. But in great pain Ulysses does not give way to excessive lamentation.
"Hold ; stay your steps ; my anguish overpowers me.
Ah wretched me ! remove this tightened bandage."
He begins to yield, but at once recovers himself.
"Cover my wound and leave me : put me down.
You make my pain the keener by your touch,
And by the jolting on the rock-strewn way."
Do you see how it is not the quieting of bodily suffering, but the chastening of the soul's suffering that produces silence ? Thus at the close of the Niptra he also reproves others, and says in dying,
"A man complains of fortune, not laments ;
It is a woman's part to weep and wail."
In his case the softer portion of the soul obeyed reason as the modest soldier obeys the stern commander.


XXII. §51. In quo vero erit perfecta sapientia (quem adhuc nos quidem vidimus neminem; sed philosophorum sententiis, qualis hic futurus sit, si modo aliquando fuerit, exponitur), is igitur sive ea ratio quae erit in eo perfecta atque absoluta sic illi parti imperabit inferiori, ut iustus parens probis filiis ; nutu, quod volet, conficiet, nullo labore, nulla molestia; eriget ipse se, suscitabit, instruet, armabit, ut tamquam hosti sic obsistat dolori. Quae sunt ista arma? Contentio, confirmatio sermoque intimus, cum ipse secum: "Cave turpe quicquam, languidum, non virile".

§52. Obversentur species honestae animo, Zeno proponatur Eleates, qui perpessus est omnia potius quam conscios delendae tyrannidis indicaret; de Anaxarcho Democritio cogitetur, qui cum Cypri in manus Timocreontis regis incidisset, nullum genus supplicii deprecatus est neque recusavit. Callanus Indus, indoctus ac barbarus, in radicibus Caucasi natus, sua voluntate vivus combustus est; nos, si pes condoluit si dens, ferre non possumus. Opinio est enim quaedam effeminata ac levis - nec in dolore magis quam eadem in voluptate -, qua cum liquescimus fluimusque mollitia, apis aculeum sine clamore ferre non possumus.

§53. At vero C. Marius, rusticanus vir, sed plane vir, cum secaretur, ut supra dixi, principio vetuit se alligari, nec quisquam ante Marium solutus dicitur esse sectus. Cur ergo postea alii? Valuit auctoritas. Videsne igitur opinionis esse, non naturae malum? Et tamen fuisse acrem morsum doloris idem Marius ostendit; crus enim alterum non praebuit. Ita et tulit dolorem ut vir, et ut homo maiorem ferre sine causa necessaria noluit.

Totum igitur in eo est, ut tibi imperes. Ostendi autem, quod esset imperandi genus; atque haec cogitatio, quid patientia, quid fortitudine, quid magnitudine animi dignissimum sit, non solum animam comprimit, sed ipsum etiam dolorem nescio quo pacto mitiorem facit.

22. Signal examples of brave endurance.

22. He in whom will be perfect wisdom —whom we have not yet seen, but philosophers define what sort of a man he will be if he shall ever at any time make his appearance—he, I say, or that reason which in him will be perfect and absolute, will govern the inferior part of the soul, as an impartial father governs his well-disposed children. He will effect his purpose as by a mere nod, without labor, without trouble. He will put himself into an erect posture, arouse himself, equip himself, arm himself, that he may take his stand against pain as if it were an enemy. What are his arms ? Energy, firmness, self-communion, in which he will say to himself, "Shun everything base, weak, unmanly." Let honorable examples become familiar to the mind, such as that of Zeno of Elea, who suffered everything rather than betray those who were concerned in the plot for abolishing the tyranny. Let there be remembrance of Anaxarchus, the disciple of Democritus, who, having fallen into the hands of Nicocreon, king of Cyprus, neither deprecated nor evaded any form of punishment. We have heard too of Calanus, the Indian, unlearned and a barbarian, born at the foot of the Caucasus, who was burned alive by his own choice. We, if a foot or a tooth gives us pain, or if there is pain in any part of the body, cannot endure it. For there is an effeminate and trivial way of thinking, no more as to pain than as to pleasure, in which, when we become dissipated and relaxed by luxurious living, we cannot bear the sting of a bee without an outcry. But Caius Marius, a man of rustic breeding, yet evidently a man, when he was to be operated upon as I have already mentioned, at the outset refused to be bound ; and it is said that no one before Marius had ever been thus operated upon without being bound. Why then did others after him do the like ? His authority had sufficient influence. Do you not see, then, that pain is an evil in opinion, and not by nature ? Yet this same Marius showed that he felt the sharp pangs of pain ; for he declined to offer the other leg for a like operation. Thus he at once bore pain like a man, and like a human being was unwilling without sufficient reason to bear more pain than was necessary. The whole of what is required consists in your having command over yourself. I have shown you what kind of command is needed ; and this habit of thinking what is most worthy of patience, of fortitude, of greatness of soul, not only exercises restraint over the mind, but also somehow makes pain itself the lighter.


XXIII. §54. Ut enim fit in proelio, ut ignavus miles ac timidus, simul ac viderit hostem, abiecto scuto fugiat, quantum possit, ob eamque causam pereat non numquam etiam integro corpore, cum ei qui steterit, nihil tale evenerit, sic qui doloris speciem ferre non possunt, abiiciunt se atque ita adflicti et exanimati iacent; qui autem restiterunt, discedunt saepissime superiores. Sunt enim quaedam animi similitudines cum corpore. Ut onera contentis corporibus facilius feruntur, remissis opprimunt, simillime animus intentione sua depellit pressum omnem ponderum, remissione autem sic urgetur, ut se nequeat extollere.

§55. Et, si verum quaerimus, in omnibus officiis persequendis animi est adhibenda contentio; ea est sola offici tamquam custodia. Sed hoc idem in dolore maxime est providendum, ne quid abiecte, ne quid timide, ne quid ignave, ne quid serviliter muliebriterve faciamus, in primisque refutetur ac reiiciatur Philocteteus ille clamor. Ingemescere non numquam viro concessum est, idque raro, eiulatus ne mulieri quidem. Et hic nimirum est "lessus", quem duodecim tabulae in funeribus adhiberi vetuerunt.

§56. Nec vero umquam ne ingemescit quidem vir fortis ac sapiens, nisi forte ut se intendat ad firmitatem, ut in stadio cursores exclamant quam maxime possunt. Faciunt idem, cum exercentur, athletae, pugiles vero, etiam cum feriunt adversarium, in iactandis caestibus ingemescunt, non quod doleant animove succumbant, sed quia profundenda voce omne corpus intenditur venitque plaga vehementior.

23. How far the sense of pain may have expression.

23. For as in battle a hesitating and timid soldier as soon as he sees the enemy throws down his shield and runs away as fast as he can, and for that very reason perishes, sometimes even without being wounded, while no such thing happens to one who maintains his ground; so those who cannot bear the appearance of pain throw themselves down and thus lie broken and dispirited, while those who have resisted very often come off superior in the conflict. There are indeed certain resemblances between soul and body. As weights are carried more easily when the muscles are in full tension, and are oppressive when the muscles are relaxed, so by a very close analogy the soul by its own strong effort excludes all the pressure of its burdens, but by the remission of its energy it is so weighed down that it cannot sustain itself. Indeed, if we would know the truth, energy of soul must be brought to bear in the faithful discharge of every duty. It is, so to speak, the sole guardian of duty. But in pain the utmost care is to be taken that we do nothing meanly, nothing timidly, nothing weakly, nothing slavishly or effeminately, and especially let outcries like those of Philoctetes be suppressed and shunned. It is sometimes permitted to a man to groan, but seldom ; nor is boisterous lamentation allowable even for a woman. It is indeed such weeping that the law of the Twelve Tables forbids at funerals. A brave and wise man never groans, unless it may be in the effort to gain added strength, as runners on the race-course cry out as noisily as they can. Athletes do the same when they are in training, and pugilists when they aim a blow at an adversary groan as they throw the caestus,—not because they are in pain or are of feeble spirit, but because by this free use of the voice the whole body is brought into vigorous tension, and the blow comes with the greater force.


XXIV. Quid? qui volunt exclamare maius, nam satis habent latera, fauces, linguam intendere, e quibus elici vocem et fundi videmus? Toto corpore atque omnibus ungulis, ut dicitur, contentioni vocis adserviunt.

§57. Genu mehercule M. Antonium vidi, cum contente pro se ipse lege Varia diceret, terram tangere. Ut enim balistae lapidum et reliqua tormenta telorum eo graviores emissiones habent, quo sunt contenta atque adducta vehementius, sic vox, sic cursus, sic plaga hoc gravior, quo est missa contentior. Cuius contentionis cum tanta vis sit, si gemitus in dolore ad confirmandum animum valebit, utemur; sin erit ille gemitus elamentabilis, si inbecillus, si abiectus, si flebilis, ei qui se dederit vix eum virum dixerim. Qui quidem gemitus si levationis aliquid adferret, tamen videremus, quid esset fortis et animosi viri; cum vero nihil imminuat doloris, cur frustra turpes esse volumus? Quid est enim fletu muliebri viro turpius?

§58. Atque hoc praeceptam, quod de dolore datur, patet latius. Omnibus enim rebus, non solum dolori, simili contentione animi resistendum est. Ira exardescit, libido concitatur; in eandem arcem confugiendum est, eadem sunt arma sumenda. Sed quoniam de dolore loquimur, illa omittamus. Ad ferendum igitur dolorem placide atque sedate plurimum proficit toto pectore, ut dicitur, cogitare quam id honestum sit. Sumus enim natura, ut ante dixi (dicendum est enim saepius), studiosissimi adpetentissimique honestatis; cuius si quasi lumen aliquod aspeximus, nihil est quod, ut eo potiamur, non parati simus et ferre et perpeti. Ex hoc cursu atque impetu animorum ad aeram laudem atque honestatem illa pericula adeuntur in proeliis; non sentiunt viri fortes in acie vulnera, vel sentiunt, sed mori malunt quam tantum modo de dignitatis gradu demoveri.

§59. Fulgentis gladios hostium videbant Decii, cum in aciem eorum inruebant. His levabat omnem vulnerum metum nobilitas mortis et gloria. Nam tam ingemuisse Epaminondam putas, cum una cum sanguine vitam effluere sentiret? Imperantem enim patriam Lacedaemoniis relinquebat, quam acceperat servientem. Haec sunt solacia, haec fomenta summorum dolorum.

24. The strong manifestation of suffering unworthy of a man.

24. What ? Do those who want to utter themselves with special force consider it enough to put into full tension the sides, the jaws, the tongue, from which we see that the voice is thrown out and poured forth? With the entire body, with tooth and nail, so to speak, they aid the effort of the voice. By Hercules, I saw Marcus Antonius [grandfather of Marc Antony], when he was pleading earnestly for himself under the Varian law, touch the ground with his knee. For as the military engines that hurl stones and those that throw weapons discharge them with the greater force, the more violently they are strained and tightened, so is the voice, the pace, the blow, the more vigorous when it proceeds from strong tension of the body. Since this tension has so much power, if groaning in pain will be of avail in strengthening the soul, we will groan; but if the groaning be mournful, imbecile, abject, tearful, I should hardly call him a man who yields to it. If our groaning really brought relief, it would still be a question what a brave and high-spirited man would do ; but since it does not in the least diminish pain, why are we willing to degrade ourselves to no purpose ? And what is more degrading to a man than effeminate weeping? Moreover, this precept which I give concerning pain has a wider application. With a like tension of soul, we should resist everything, not pain alone. Anger is inflamed; lust is roused, — we must resort to the same citadel ; the same weapons are to be wielded. But since I am speaking about pain, I will omit other subjects. In order then to bear pain placidly and calmly, it is of great avail to think, so to speak, with the whole heart, how honorable such endurance is. We are by nature, as I have already said (for it needs to be often repeated), exceedingly earnest for and desirous of honor, of which if we get, as it were, a mere glimpse, there is nothing which we are not ready to bear and to suffer in order to obtain possession of it. It is from this pursuit and urgent endeavor of the soul with genuine merit and honor in view, that dangers are faced in battle. Brave men, while in the ranks, do not feel wounds, or if they feel them, they prefer death to the slightest departure from their honorable position. The Decii saw the swords of their enemies glittering when they rushed upon their ranks. The nobleness and glory of death relieved them from all fear of being wounded. Do you think that Epaminondas groaned when he felt his life flowing out with his blood ? No ; for he left his country dictating terms to the Lacedaemonians to whom he had found it subject. These are the reliefs, the emollients for the severest pain.


XXV. §60. Dices: quid in pace, quid domi, quid in lectulo? ad philosophos me revocas, qui in aciem non saepe prodeunt. E quibus homo sane levis, Heracleotes Dionysius, cum a Zenone fortis esse didicisset, a dolore dedoctus est. Nam cum ex renibus laboraret, ipso in eiulatu clamitabat falsa esse illa quae antea de dolore ipse sensisset. Quem cum Cleanthes condiscipulus rogaret quaenam ratio eum de sententia deduxisset, respondit: "Quia, cum tantum operae philosophiae dedissem, si dolorem tamen ferre non possem, satis esset argumenti malum esse dolorem. Plurimos autem annos in philosophia consumpsi nec ferre possum; malum est igitur dolor. "Tum Cleanthem, cum pede terram percussisset, versum ex Epigonis ferunt dixisse:

Audisne haec Amphiarae sub terram abdite?
Zenonem significabat, a quo illum degenerare dolebat.

§61. At non noster Posidonius; quem et ipse saepe vidi et id dicam, quod solebat narrare Pompeius, se, cum Rhodum venisset decedens ex Syria, audire voluisse Posidonium; sed cum audisset eum graviter esse aegrum, quod vehementer eius artus laborarent, voluisse tamen nobilissimum philosophum visere; quem ut vidisset et salutavisset honorificisque verbis prosecutus esset molesteque se dixisset ferre, quod eum non posset audire, at ille "Tu vero", inquit, "potes, nec committam ut dolor corporis efficiat ut frustra tantus vir ad me venerit. "Itaque narrabat eum graviter et copiose de hoc ipso, nihil esse bonum, nisi quod esset honestum, cubantem disputavisse, cumque quasi faces ei doloris admoverentur, saepe dixisse: "Nihil agis, dolor! quamvis sis molestus, numquam te esse confitebor malum".

25. Contrasted examples of this and its opposite.

25. You will ask, How is it in peace ? How, at home ? How, in bed ? You recall me to philosophers, who do not often go to war. Of these, Dionysius of Heraclea, a man of no great weight of character, having learned of Zeno to be brave, was taught the contrary lesson by pain ; for when he was suffering from disease of the kidneys, he cried out among his exclamations of distress that what he had before believed about pain was false. When his fellow-disciple Cleanthes asked him what reasoning had drawn him away from his former opinion, he answered, " That when I had devoted so much labor to philosophy I could not bear pain, is a sufficient proof that pain is an evil. I did consume many years in philosophy ; I cannot bear pain : therefore pain is an evil." Cleanthes then is said, striking the ground with his foot, to have repeated the verse from the Epigoni, [of Aeschylus]

"Among the dead hear'st thou this, Amphiaraus ?"
meaning Zeno, from whom he was sorry that his disciple had fallen away. But it was otherwise with my friend the philosopher Posidonius, whom I myself often saw, and I will relate a story which Pompey was in the habit of telling. When Pompey was on his way from Syria, he wanted to hear Posidonius ; and learning that he was severely ill, suffering greatly from the gout, he still desired to visit this most noble philosopher. When he had seen him, and saluted him, and addressed him in respectful terms, and expressed his grief at not being able to hear him, he replied, "You indeed can hear me, nor will I suffer that any pain of body should cause so great a man to come to me in vain." And so, as Pompey said, lying on his bed, he lectured impressively and fluently on the proposition that nothing is good except the Right; and when pain applied to him, as it were, its lighted torches, he often exclaimed, "Pain, thou art of no effect. Troublesome as thou art, I will never admit that thou art an evil." In fine, all forms of affliction, when made illustrious and noble by despising them, become endurable.


XXVI. §62. Omninoque omnes clari et nobilitati labores continuo fiunt etiam tolerabiles. Videmusne ut, apud quos eorum ludorum qui gymnici nominantur magnus honos sit, nullum ab eis qui in id certamen descendant devitari dolorem? apud quos autem venandi et equitandi laus viget, qui hanc petessunt, nullum fugiunt dolorem. Quid de nostris ambitionibus, quid de cupiditate honorum loquar? quae flamma est per quam non cucurrerint ii qui haec olim punctis singulis colligebant? Itaque semper Africanus Socraticum Xenophontem in manibus habebat, cuius in primis laudabat illud, quod diceret eosdem labores non esse aeque graves imperatori et militi, quod ipse honos laborem leviorem faceret imperatorium.

§63. Sed tamen hoc evenit, ut in vulgus insipientium opinio valeat honestatis, cum ipsam videre non possint. Itaque fama et multitudinis iudicio moventur, cum id honestum putent quod a plerisque laudetur. Te autem, si in oculis sis multitudinis, tamen eius iudicio stare nolim nec, quod illa putet, idem putare pulcherrimum. Tuo tibi iudicio est utendum; tibi si recta probanti placebis, tum non modo tete viceris, quod paulo ante praecipiebam, sed omnes et omnia.

§64. Hoc igitur tibi propone, amplitudinem animi et quasi quandam exaggerationem quam altissimam animi, quae maxime eminet contemnendis et despiciendis doloribus, unam esse omnium rem pulcherrimam, eoque pulchriorem, si vacet populo neque plausum captans se tamen ipsa delectet. Quin etiam mihi quidem laudabiliora videntur omnia, quae sine venditatione et sine populo teste fiunt, non quo fugiendus sit (omnia enim bene facta in luce se collocari volunt), sed tamen nullum theatrum virtuti conscientia maius est.

26. The power of the sentiment of honor.

26. Do we not see among the men who hold in great honor the games called "gymnastic" that no pain is shunned by those who strive for the mastery ? Among the men with whom hunting and horsemanship are held in the highest esteem, those who are versed in these arts avoid no pain. What shall we say of our own ambitions ? What of our desire for places of honor ? What flame is so hot, that candidates for office were not formerly ready to run through it to collect single votes ? Thus Africanus always had in his hands Xenophon, the disciple of Socrates, in whom he was especially delighted with the saying that the same labors are not equally burdensome to the commander and the soldier, because the very honor makes the commander's labor lighter. But yet it is a fact that the sentiment of honor has great power with the uncultivated common people, even when they do not clearly see what it implies. They are still moved by fame and by the opinion of the multitude, regarding that as honorable which has the applause of the greatest number. I would not indeed have you, if you are before the eyes of the multitude, stand by their opinion, or regard as such what they deem supremely excellent. You must use your own judgment. If you satisfy yourself in approving what is right, you will not only have conquered yourself, as a little while ago I bade you do, but you will have conquered all men and all things. This then I lay down for your guidance, that a certain breadth of mind, together with the utmost loftiness of soul that can be attained, which is especially manifest in scorn and contempt for pain, is the one most excellent thing of all, and the more excellent, if it is independent of the people, and not seeking applause, finds delight in its very self. Indeed, all things seem to me more praiseworthy which are done without ostentation, and not in order to be seen by the multitude, — not that their, observation is to be shunned (for everything that is well done craves to be placed in the light) ; but yet there is no greater theatre for virtue than one's own consciousness.


XXVII. §65. Atque in primis meditemur illud, ut haec patientia dolorum quam saepe iam animi intentione dixi esse firmandam, in omni genere se aequabilem praebeat. Saepe enim multi qui aut propter victoriae cupiditatem aut propter gloriae aut etiam, ut ius suum et libertatem tenerent, vulnera exceperunt fortiter et tulerunt, iidem omissa contentione dolorem morbi ferre non possunt; neque enim illum quem facile tulerant ratione aut sapientia tulerant, sed studio potius et gloria. Itaque barbari quidam et inmanes ferro decertare acerrime possunt, aegrotare viriliter non queunt. Graeci autem homines, non satis animosi, prudentes, ut est captus hominum, satis, hostem aspicere non possunt, eidem morbos toleranter atque humane ferunt. At Cimbri et Celtiberi in proeliis exultant, lamentantur in morbo. Nihil enim potest esse aequabile, quod non a certa ratione proficiscatur.

§66. Sed cum videas eos qui aut studio aut opinione ducantur, in eo persequendo atque adipiscendo dolore non frangi, debeas existimare aut non esse malum dolorem aut, etiamsi, quicquid asperum alienumque natura sit, id appellari placeat malum, tantulum tamen esse, ut a virtute ita obruatur, ut nusquam appareat. Quae meditare, quaeso, dies et noctes. Latius enim manabit haec ratio et aliquanto maiorem locum quam de uno dolore occupabit. Nam si omnia fugiendae turpitudinis adipiscendaeque honestatis causa faciemus, non modo stimulos doloris, sed etiam fulmina fortunae contemnamus licebit, praesertim cum paratum sit illud ex hesterna disputatione perfugium.

§67. Ut enim, si cui naviganti praedones insequantur, deus qui dixerit: "Eiice te navi; praesto est, qui excipiat, vel delphinus, ut Arionem Methymnaeum vel equi Pelopis illi Neptanii, qui "per undas currus suspensos rapuisse "dicuntur, excipient te et, quo velis, perferent", omnem omittat timorem, sic urgentibus asperis et odiosis doloribus, si tanti sint, ut ferendi non sint, quo sit confugiendum, tu vides.

Haec fere hoc tempore putavi esse dicenda. Sed tu fortasse in sententia permanes.

A. Minime vero, meque biduo duarum rerum quas maxime timebam spero liberatum metu.

M. Cras ergo ad clepsydram ; sic enim diximus, et tibi hoc video non posse deberi.

A. Ita prorsus, et illud quidem ante meridiem, hoc eodem tempore.

M. Sic faciemus tuisque optimis studiis obsequemur.

27. How the capacity of bearing pain is to be strengthened.

27. Moreover, let us consider that this capacity of bearing pain, which, as I have already often said, is to be strengthened by the soul's earnest endeavor, should show itself the same under all circumstances. For many who, from the desire of victory or of fame, or even for the maintenance of their rights and their liberty, have received and borne wounds bravely, are unable to bear the pain ensuing from disease, the effort of the soul being suspended ; for the pain which they had easily endured they had endured not by the aid of reason or wisdom, but rather for ambition and glory. In like manner, there are certain barbarous and savage men who can fight with the sword most bravely, yet cannot bear illness manfully. But the Greeks, with very little courage, yet as wise as men are capable of being, though they cannot look an enemy in the face, bear illness patiently and cheerfully. On the other hand, the Cimbri and the Celtiberi, when ill, are in deep distress ; for there can be no perfect consistency which has not determinate reason for its foundation. But when you see that those who are under the leading of desire or belief are not broken down by pain in the pursuit and attainment of their aim, you ought to conclude, either that pain is not an evil, or, if you see fit to call whatever is annoying and uncongenial with nature an evil, that it is an evil of so very little magnitude that virtue may bury it out of sight. I beg you to meditate on these things day and night ; for this mode of reasoning will have a wider application, and will occupy a somewhat larger space than concerns pain alone. If we do everything for the sake of shunning disgrace and obtaining merited honor, we may despise not only the stings of pain, but equally the thunderbolts of fortune, especially since our yesterday's discussion prepares a refuge for us. As were some god to say to a sailor pursued by pirates, "Throw yourself from the ship; either a dolphin is ready to receive you, as one rescued Arion of Methymna, or else those horses of Neptune sent for Pelops that are said to have drawn chariots floating on the crest of the wave will take you up and carry you where you want to go," he would feel no fear ; so when annoying and hateful pains press upon you, if they are such as are not to be borne, you see where you are to take refuge. This is in substance what, as it seemed to me, needed to be said at the present time. But you perhaps remain in your former opinion.

A. By no means, indeed. These two days, I trust, have freed me from fear of the two things which I most dreaded.

M. To-morrow then to the clock; for thus we measure our exercises in rhetoric. At the same time I see that for philosophy you will not leave me in debt to you.

A. So be it, — the rhetoric indeed before noon ; the philosophy at the same time as yesterday and to-day.

M. We will make this arrangement, and comply with your best wishes.

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